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By Hosch Professor Dan T. Coenen

Editor’s Note: The New Georgia Encyclopedia is a recently
launched, wholly online treatment of our state’s history, geography,
politics, literature, commerce and other related subjects. Last summer,
John Inscoe, UGA professor of history and editor of the encyclopedia,
invited Hosch Professor Dan T. Coenen to contribute a series of essays
on the most significant U.S. Supreme Court cases that originated in
the state of Georgia. The following article, which proposes an
unranked top 15 list, is built on this work. Coenen invites readers to
ll Supreme Court decisions are
important, and they are important for different reasons. Some
decisions establish societyshaping precedents or sharply alter the
direction of the development of the law.
Other rulings respond to or trigger critical
historical events. Some Supreme Court
cases are important because they involve
matters of life or death for the litigants and
perhaps, as a practical matter, for large
numbers of others as well. It is impossible
to compare the importance of these different types of decisions or even to speak of
them as if they are tied together by a common thread. It is also impossible to say with

share any reactions to this essay by passing along comments – especially about other cases that would be proper candidates for this listing –
to coenen@uga.edu. He said, “Don’t hesitate to be critical because I
surely have overlooked some important information, and there is
always room for helpful discussion and disagreement about any listing of this kind. Certainly, I can imagine no better set of consultants,
particularly on this subject, than the graduates of Georgia’s premier
law school.”

confidence that all cases selected for a list of
this kind do in fact merit inclusion. Other
informed observers will surely disagree with
some of my choices. (In fact, a number of
my colleagues already have.)
The inevitably controversial nature of this
sort of listing reveals an important truth.
The decisions of the Supreme Court touch
the lives of Americans in a wide range of
powerful ways, and they have done so from
the first days of the republic. The 15 decisions identified here illustrate the complexity, the variety and the significance of the
Supreme Court’s work as well as the key
role that controversies rooted in Georgia
have played in shaping our nation’s history.
I have not listed these cases in an order
designed to suggest my sense of their relative importance. Instead, I have tried to
arrange them in a way that highlights
how they relate to one another
and how they fit into the broader tapestry of the court’s
work. The 15 cases are:

West Façade of the Supreme
Court Building

Furman v. Georgia (1972)
Before 1972, Georgia and other states that
provided for capital punishment used systems that afforded broad discretion to juries
in deciding whether to impose the death
penalty on persons convicted of death-eligible offenses. In Furman, the court struck
down this feature of Georgia’s capital sentencing scheme and in effect invalidated the
death penalty, as then administered,
throughout the United States. The court, in
a five-to-four decision, reasoned that capital
sentencing based on the unguided discretion of juries offends the Cruel and
Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth
Amendment because it permits juries to
impose the distinctively profound sentence
of death on some convicted defendants
while other juries impose the far different
sentence of life imprisonment on far larger
numbers of similarly situated defendants
convicted of the same
crime. There was no
majority opinion in
Furman, but Justice
Potter Stewart captured
the thought of a critical
group of justices when
he wrote: “These death
Justice Potter Stewart sentences are cruel and
unusual in the same way that being struck
by lightning is cruel and unusual.” The
Eighth Amendment, he explained, “cannot
tolerate the infliction of a sentence of death
under legal systems that permit this unique
Spring/Summer
Summer 2004
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penalty to be so wantonly and so freakishly
imposed.”

Gregg v. Georgia (1976)
Some observers predicted that Furman
would spell the end of the death penalty in
the United States. Many states, including
Georgia, however, responded to the
Furman ruling by enacting new death
penalty statutes. Some state legislatures
reformed their laws to deal with the problem of undue jury discretion by mandating
capital punishment for all persons convicted
of first-degree murder. The Georgia General
Assembly sought to deal with concerns
about arbitrariness by adopting a so-called
“guided discretion” capital-sentencing
scheme. Under this scheme, if the defendant was convicted of first-degree murder
or another death-eligible offense, the prosecutor could ask the court to conduct a second “penalty stage” of the trial. Following
this second proceeding, the jury could
impose the death sentence only if it found
that the prosecution had proven a statutorily specified “aggravating circumstance”
(such as that the murder was motivated by
financial gain or directed at an on-duty correctional officer or a judge). In addition,
even if the prosecution proved an aggravating circumstance, the jury could decline to
impose the death sentence, and impose a
life sentence instead, if it found that “mitigating evidence” (such as emotional difficulties or childhood abuse of the defendant)
warranted leniency in the particular case. In
Gregg, the court, by a seven-to-two vote,
upheld Georgia’s guided-discretion
approach to capital punishment, while in
companion decisions the
court invalidated other
states’ mandatory deathpenalty statutes as
“unduly harsh and
unworkably rigid.” The
decisive opinion in
Gregg, joined by justices
Justice Byron R. White
Stewart, Byron R. White
and John Paul Stevens,
reasoned that Georgia
had adequately
addressed the problem
of unfettered jury discretion that had triggered
the court’s finding of a
Justice John Paul
constitutional violation
Stevens
in Furman. The court
Spring/Summer 2004

added that “respect for the ability of a legislature to evaluate, in terms of its particular
state, the moral consensus concerning the
death penalty and its social utility as a sanction require us to conclude that [it] is not
unconstitutionally severe.” The “guided discretion” approach to the death penalty,
upheld by the court in Gregg, has been
adopted in a large majority of states and
continues to control capital sentencing in
murder cases throughout the nation to the
present day.

McCleskey v. Kemp (1987)
In the wake of Gregg, litigants continued to
challenge capital sentences, and the most
far-reaching challenge came in the
McCleskey case. Warren McCleskey was an
African-American man convicted of murdering a white police officer in Fulton
County. In attacking his death sentence,
McCleskey brought before the court an
expert statistical study that indicated that
juries in Georgia are far more likely to
impose the death penalty if the victim is
white and most likely to impose the death
penalty if the victim is white and the murderer is black. This evidence showed,
according to McCleskey, that Georgia’s
guided-discretion scheme was so fraught
with race discrimination in its real-world
operation that it violated both the Eighth
Amendment and the Equal Protection
Clause of the 14th Amendment. The court,
however, rejected this argument, thus saving
Georgia’s capital sentencing scheme from
potentially insuperable constitutional difficulties. Writing for a
five-justice majority,
Justice Lewis F. Powell
Jr. noted that
McCleskey had offered
“no evidence specific to
his own case that would
support an inference
Justice Lewis F.
that racial considerations
Powell Jr.
played a part in his sentence” and added that “[w]here the discretion that is fundamental to our criminal
process is involved, we decline to assume
that what is unexplained is invidious.”
Coker v. Georgia (1977)
Despite the rejection of sweeping attacks on
capital sentencing in Gregg and McCleskey,
litigants have successfully challenged particular features of state death-penalty laws in a
number of Supreme Court cases. A particu-

larly significant ruling came in Coker v.
Georgia, which invalidated Georgia’s effort
to extend eligibility for the death penalty to
persons convicted of the crime of rape. In
finding this feature of the Georgia deathpenalty law unconstitutional, the Supreme
Court reasoned that punishments violate the
Eighth Amendment if they are “excessive in
relation to the crime committed,” that
determinations about excessiveness are properly informed by “country’s present judgment,” and that the Georgia law could not
survive this type of inquiry because no other
state subjected persons convicted of the rape
of an adult woman to execution. Coker has
been read to establish that governments may
not extend the death penalty to most, and
perhaps all, non-murder offenses. In addition, the court has invoked the underlying
excessiveness rationale of Coker in later cases
to invalidate death sentences even for deathrelated crimes, such as murders committed
by persons who are mentally retarded or
younger than 16 years old.

Heart of Atlanta Motel
v. United States (1964)
Many path-breaking Supreme Court cases
have grown out of Georgia’s long and tragic
history of race discrimination. Critical decisions have concerned racially motivated
murders and beatings, deprivations of voting rights, and governmental segregation of
parks and other public facilities. Perhaps no
decisions have had a greater practical
impact, however, than Heart of Atlanta
Motel and its companion case from
Alabama, Katzenbach v. McClung, in which
the Supreme Court upheld the public
accommodations provisions of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. By 1964, it was well
settled that the Equal Protection Clause
barred almost all state-imposed racial classifications that disadvantaged African
Americans. Discrimination in the private
sector, however, remained widespread.
Under the leadership of President Lyndon
B. Johnson, in the wake of the Kennedy
assassination, Congress mustered the will to
proscribe in broad terms racial discrimination by many private service providers,
including hotels, motels and restaurants
that sold food that had moved across state
lines. The constitutional difficulty was that
none of Congress’ enumerated powers
unequivocally supported the enactment of
the 1964 Civil Rights Act, and challengers
Advocate
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assailed the legislation as impinging on state
prerogatives to regulate local matters free
from federal interference. A unanimous
court, however, found that the law was a
proper exercise of Congress’ Article I,
Section 8, power to “regulate Commerce ...
among the several States.” In effect, the
court reasoned that race discrimination by
even very localized businesses, when viewed
in the aggregate, had such far-reaching negative effects on the interstate movement of
people and products that Congress could
remove these impediments to commerce
whether or not its underlying motives arose
out of moral condemnation. Ensuing
enforcement of the Civil Rights Act led to
the dismantling of most overt forms of
racial discrimination, which in turn contributed to the emergence of the “New
South” and the explosion of economic
activity that spread through the Sun Belt in
future decades.

United States v. Darby (1941)
The decisions in which the court upheld the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 built on Commerce
Clause precedents handed down during the
presidency of Franklin D. Roosevelt. During
his first term of office, President Roosevelt
sought to respond to the Great Depression
by pushing through Congress a program of
reform that deeply injected the federal government into regulation of such matters as
working conditions in local facilities. Relying
on constitutional arguments about state
autonomy, the Supreme Court invalidated
several of these laws during 1935 and 1936.
Following President Roosevelt’s landslide
reelection in 1936, however, the court dramatically shifted direction and began to
reject states-rights challenges to federal initiatives founded on the commerce power. A
critical juncture came in the Darby case,
which involved the prosecution of a lumber
manufacturer located in Statesboro for violating the minimum-wage and maximum-hour
protections put in place by the recently
enacted federal Fair Labor Standards Act.
Overruling earlier precedent, the court held
that the law was a proper exercise of the congressional commerce power, including in its
application to local manufacturing concerns.
The rationale of Darby ushered in an era of
such extreme judicial deference to assertions
of congressional authority that no federal law
was found to exceed the commerce power
for the next 54 years.
12
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Screws v. United States (1945)
Congress’ enumerated powers reach beyond
the Commerce Clause, and a particularly
important grant of authority permits federal
legislators to enact “appropriate legislation”
to enforce the 14th Amendment’s prohibition on state action that deprives persons of
“equal protection” or “life, liberty or property without due process of law.” Close on
the heels of the ratification of the 14th
Amendment, Congress passed several civil
rights statutes pursuant to this power,
including one that makes it a federal crime
for a person “willfully” to deprive another
of “any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution” if the deprivation occurs “under color” of state law.
Although this statute had long lain dormant, the federal Justice Department
invoked it in the Screws case to prosecute
three Baker County law enforcement officers who allegedly killed an African
American suspected of stealing a tire by
“beating him with their fists and with a
solid-bar blackjack” in the absence of any
provocation. After the defendants were convicted in federal court, the Supreme Court
in Screws ordered a new trial on the ground
that the trial judge had not given accurate
instructions to the jury
on the meaning of the
statutory term “willfully.” (Justice William O.
Douglas observed that
“[e]ven those guilty of
the most heinous
offenses are entitled to a
Justice William O.
fair trial.” Notably,
Douglas
upon retrial, all three
defendants were acquitted.) The key precedent established by the case, however, came
in the court’s declaration that the taking of
the victim’s life had occurred “under color”
of state law so that a prosecution under the
federal civil rights statute was permissible.
Three dissenting justices argued that the
beating did not meet the under-color-ofstate-law requirement because the defendants had violated, rather than adhered to,
state law according to the prosecution’s own
evidence. The dissenters also urged that permitting a federal prosecution for what they
viewed as a local murder would bring about
“a revolutionary change in the balance of
the political relations between the National
Government and the States.” The majority,
however, concluded it sufficed to meet the

under-color-of-state-law requirement that
“the officers of the State were performing
official duties,” whether or not “the power
they were authorized to exercise was misused.” In so ruling, the court opened the
door for sweeping invocations of the longunused Reconstruction-era federal civil
rights statutes in ensuing decades. The
majority’s ruling also bespoke something
more – a rising willingness within the court
to address issues of racial injustice that
would, within a decade, produce the seminal school-desegregation decision in Brown
v. Board of Education.

Gray v. Sanders (1963)
Chief Justice Earl
Warren once said the
most important judicial
pronouncements of his
tenure were not the
momentous schooldesegregation decisions,
but the Supreme Court’s
Chief Justice Earl
rulings that compelled
Warren
states throughout the
nation to reconfigure their electoral processes pursuant to the principle of “one person,

Spring/Summer 2004
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one vote.” The very first of many Supreme
Court decisions that applied this principle
came as a result of a legal challenge brought
by James Sanders, a voter in Fulton County,
that targeted Georgia’s county-unit voting
system in its application to elections for
senator, governor and other officers chosen
on a statewide basis. The problem with the
system, according to Sanders, was that it
gave residents of small counties far more
voting power than residents of more populous counties. Indeed, the favoritism shown
to rural areas was so great that counties that
were home to only one-third of Georgia’s
population held a majority of county-unit
votes for purposes of selecting each of these
elected officials. In striking down this voting scheme under the Equal Protection
Clause, the court insisted, in an opinion by
Justice Douglas, that the American “conception of political equality ... can only
mean one thing - one person, one vote.” In
its 1964 ruling in Wesberry v. Sanders,
another case out of Georgia, the court built
on Gray to hold that all federal congressional districts within a state had to be made up
of a roughly equal number of voters. In so
ruling, the court radically altered how state

View of the east wall, bench and frieze of the courtroom where the Supreme Court has sat since 1935.
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legislatures would thereafter configure congressional districts, which until then often
reflected long-established groupings of counties that ignored intervening urbanization
and other major shifts in population.
Within four months of Wesberry, the court
ruled in its most famous reapportionment
decision, Reynolds v. Sims, a case out of
Alabama, that the Constitution required the
equal valuation of votes in all elections for
representatives who served in either chamber
of any state legislature. As a result, the court
scuttled the legislative electoral systems of
most states, including often-used “little federalism” systems that, following the model
of the Constitution’s treatment of the U.S.
Senate, structured districts for one house of
the state legislature according to geography,
rather than population. The Warren court’s
reapportionment decisions, beginning with
Gray, dramatically reshaped the nature of
representative government in Georgia and
throughout the nation. No less important,
the principle of electoral equality that
underlies these cases has continued to generate important decisions in more recent times
– most prominently the Supreme Court’s
ruling in Bush v. Gore, which brought an
end to the spirited legal challenges triggered
by the presidential election of 2000.

City of Rome v. United States
(1980)
Race-based discrimination with respect to
voting has pervaded American history, and
Congress aggressively attacked this wrong
by adopting the Voting Rights Act of 1965.
At issue in the City of Rome case was the
most controversial provision of this statute,
which requires federal Justice Department
approval of any change in any voting practice put in place by a locale marked by a
history of discrimination if that change has
either “the purpose [or] the effect of denying or abridging the vote on account of race
or color.” This case grew out of an effort by
Rome to alter both the city’s electorate and
its electoral system by annexing neighboring
areas and adopting an at-large voting
scheme for the selection of city commissioners. Rome offered evidence that it had
not pursued these changes with any racially
discriminatory purpose, but Justice
Department approval was denied nonetheless on the ground that the reforms would
have an adverse effect on the ability of
African Americans to secure local represen-

tation. Confronted with a constitutional
challenge to Congress’ authority to adopt
this effects-based standard, the court sided
with the Justice Department and blocked
Rome’s effort to reconfigure its method of
self-governance. In recognizing Congress’
power under the 15th Amendment to
attack the racially discriminatory effects of
voting changes, even in the absence of a
racially discriminatory purpose, the court
both sustained and illustrated the power of
the most far-reaching feature of modern
federal voting rights legislation.

Chisholm v. Georgia (1793)
Chisholm v. Georgia is the most famous and
the most important of the Supreme Court’s
eighteenth-century decisions. The court’s
ruling arose out of an action brought in
federal court by a citizen from South
Carolina to recover on a debt allegedly
owed to him by the state of Georgia. Upon
receiving notice of the action, Georgia
refused to appear. It asserted that, as a sovereign state, it possessed immunity from
suit, absent its consent, even though the
Constitution specifies that federal courts
have jurisdiction to decide cases “between a
State and citizens of another State.” Citing
this text, the Supreme Court rejected
Georgia’s sovereign-immunity argument
and ordered Georgia to pay the South
Carolina plaintiff the money damages he
sought. In the wake of this decision, howls
of protest rose throughout the country.
Within five years, Congress had proposed
and the states had ratified the 11th
Amendment, which overturned the principle of Chisholm by providing that “[t]he
judicial power of the United States shall not
be construed to extend to any suit in law or
equity, commenced or prosecuted against
one of the United States by Citizens of
another State ... .” To this day, Chisholm
stands as one of only a handful of Supreme
Court rulings that have been overturned by
constitutional amendment. Even more
important, the Supreme Court has built on
the repudiation of Chisholm to hold that
the 11th Amendment exemplifies a sovereign-immunity principle that sweeps well
beyond the amendment’s text. Invoking this
principle, the court has sheltered states from
almost all money-damage actions brought
in any court, even when initiated by a
state’s own residents based on clear violations of federal statutory law.

Advocate
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Worcester v. Georgia (1832)
Prior to the forced removal from Georgia of
thousands of Native Americans on the infamous Trail of Tears, Reverend Samuel A.
Worcester was convicted in a Georgia court
for settling in the territory of the Cherokee
Nation without obtaining the required state
license to do so. In a decision that overturned this conviction,
Chief Justice John
Marshall laid down cardinal principles regarding the relationship of
Native American tribes,
the nation and the
states. As he observed:
Chief Justice John
“The Cherokee nation,
Marshall
then, is a distinct community, occupying its own territory, with
boundaries accurately described, in which
the laws of Georgia can have no force ...
but with the assent of the Cherokees themselves, or in conformity with the treaties,
and with the acts of congress.” Worcester is
well known largely because it was in
response to this decision that President
Andrew Jackson supposedly made his ominous observation: “John Marshall has made
his decision, now let him enforce it.” Even
more important, the ruling and reasoning
of Worcester – and, in particular, its conception of Native American Nations as possessing important elements of sovereignty – has
been drawn on in hundreds of ensuing
cases. To be sure, a theoretical commitment
to this principle of sovereignty has often
done little to protect Native American
Nations from the worst forms of oppression. Such protections as the institutions of
American government have afforded those
nations, however, sprung primarily from
notions of tribal integrity that trace their
roots to Worcester.
Fletcher v. Peck (1810)
The Fletcher case arose out of the Yazoo
land scandal that came to light after bribed
members of the Georgia legislature voted in
January of 1795 to sell for a bargain-basement price the vast frontier that comprises
most of modern-day Alabama and
Mississippi. A rescinding act adopted by a
later and more upright Georgia legislature
resulted in a constitutional challenge to the
act’s divestiture of title from prior buyers as
well as third-party purchasers who had
bought parcels of the tract from the original

14
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grantees. In Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion
in Fletcher, the court sustained this challenge, establishing – as Professor Robert G.
McCloskey has written – “the first clear
precedent for the general proposition that
the Supreme Court is empowered to hold
state laws unconstitutional.” (The court’s
earlier and more famous decision in
Marbury v. Madison had recognized the
court’s ability to strike down acts of
Congress, without specifically considering
the court’s power to invalidate state laws.)
Fletcher is important for other reasons as
well. The case laid the basis for the important principle that the limitations imposed
by the Impairment of Contract Clause
extend to governmental, as well as private,
contractual obligations. Even more important, the court’s opinion in Fletcher hinted
at the notion that Americans may possess
judicially enforceable rights rooted not so
much in the specific language of the
Constitution as in “general principles,
which are common to our free institutions.”
Picking up on this theme, much of the
court’s most controversial work during the
remaining course of its history has explored
the extent to which the court may protect
human rights that do not find clear expression in the constitutional text.

Doe v. Bolton (1973)
The court in Fletcher may have flirted with
the notion of unenumerated individual
rights in part because the original Bill of
Rights applied only to the federal government and not to the states. One consequence of the Civil War, however, was the
adoption of the 14th Amendment, which
broadly (but obliquely) stipulated that: “No
State shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States; nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law ... .”
After the Privileges and Immunities Clause
was given a narrow interpretation in 1872,
the court turned its attention to the Due
Process Clause. In a key line of cases, the
court concluded that virtually all of the Bill
of Rights guarantees – such as the rights to a
jury trial, to the assistance of counsel and to
confront one’s accusers – had been “incorporated” into the Due Process Clause and
thereby made applicable to the states. These
incorporation decisions did not concern
only the procedural safeguards afforded to

criminal defendants. They also barred the
states from, for example, interfering with the
substantive rights of free speech and the free
exercise of religion protected by the First
Amendment. The question next arose
whether this so-called “substantive due
process” principle embraced fundamental
liberties that lay outside of the express protections of the Bill of Rights. In a series of
decisions, dating back nearly a century, the
court held that such protections do exist.
Perhaps the most well known of these cases,
Roe v. Wade – as well as its companion case
out of Georgia, Doe v. Bolton – established
the principle that the Due Process Clause
affords broad constitutional protection to a
woman’s decision to terminate a pregnancy,
in consultation with her doctor, prior to the
period of fetal viability.
In Doe, Justice Harry A.
Blackmun, writing for
seven members of the
court, held that the
Constitution rendered
invalid not only absolute
bans on abortion but
Justice Harry A.
more qualified prohibiBlackmun
tions as well – here, a
statute that, while generally outlawing abortion, authorized the procedure upon
approval of a hospital committee in cases
that involved serious threats to the pregnant
woman’s health, risks of serious birth defects
if the fetus were carried to term, or a pregnancy that had resulted from rape. Rejecting
in particular the states’ committee-review
requirement, the court spoke broadly of
“[t]he woman’s right to receive medical care
in accordance with her licensed physician’s
best judgment.”

Stanley v. Georgia (1969)
In another leading substantive-due-process
case, the court in the Stanley case held that
an individual has a constitutional right to
possess obscene materials even though
obscenity does not ordinarily enjoy protection under the First Amendment’s Free
Speech and Free Press
Clauses. In an opinion
by Justice Thurgood
Marshall, the court
declared that “fundamental is the right to be
free, except in very limited circumstances, from
Justice Thurgood
unwanted governmental
Marshall
Spring/Summer 2004
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Georgia Law Students Attend
Pledge Case as Guest of
Supreme Court Justice
In late March, third-year student Kevin A. Gooch and
second-year student Kira Y. Fonteneau traveled to
Washington, D.C., to sit in on the U.S. Supreme
Court hearing of the Elk Grove Unified School District
v. Michael A. Newdow, et al. case as personal guests
of Supreme Court Associate Justice Clarence Thomas.
Later this year, the court will rule on whether the
Pledge of Allegiance should be banned from public
schools for its use of the words “under God.” To the
right, Fonteneau (l.) and Gooch (r.) are pictured on
either side of Thomas.

intrusions into one’s privacy,” particularly
the “right to satisfy [one’s] intellectual and
emotional needs in the privacy of his
home.” Drawing on earlier decisions, the
court emphasized the “right to receive ideas
regardless of their social worth” and
declared that the “makers of our
Constitution ... conferred, as against the
Government, the right to be let alone – the
most comprehensive of rights and the right
most valued by civilized man.” Cutting a
channel for future legal developments, the
court also suggested that a constitutional
claim of the right to privacy “takes on an
added dimension” when it involves activity
“in the privacy of a person’s own home.”

Bowers v. Hardwick (1986)
Relying on the place-centered rationale of

Stanley, Michael Hardwick brought an
action that challanged the application of
Georgia’s criminal sodomy law to acts of
homosexual intimacy between consenting
adults that occur within the home. In a
five-to-four decision, the Supreme Court
rejected Hardwick’s argument, reasoning
that the court “comes nearest to illegitimacy
when it deals with judge-made constitutional law having little or no cognizable
roots in the language or design of the
Constitution.” The court acknowledged
that “the cases are legion” in which it had
construed the Due Process Clause to protect important substantive personal interests. The court, however, found that none
of those cases mandated invalidation of
Georgia’s ban on consensual sodomy. The
court distinguished Roe and Doe, for exam-

ple, as involving the distinctively profound
and life-altering choice of whether “to beget
or bear a child” and reasoned that Stanley
was “firmly grounded in the First
Amendment.” The court’s decision in
Bowers, however, hardly ended debate about
the proper scope of constitutional liberty
possessed by homosexuals and other
American citizens. Justice Powell, who had
provided the critical fifth vote in Hardwick,
said of the case after his retirement from the
bench: “I think I probably made a mistake
in that one.” And, in 2003, a new five-justice majority, overruled the Bowers decision
in Lawrence v. Texas, declaring that a general
ban on consensual adult sodomy “furthers
no legitimate state interest which can justify
its intrusion into the personal and private
life of the individual.” ■

The New Georgia Encyclopedia can be found at www.georgiaencyclopedia.org.
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